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NATURE OF CASE 
Plaintiff seeks damages for injuries received when a private 
ambulance, owned and operated by defendant, ran a red light at 
a traffic controlled intersection in Ogden, Weber County, Utah, 
and collided with the vehicle of plaintiff, which was proceeding 
through said intersection on the green light. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The jury rendered a verdict in favor of the defendant, No 
Cause of Action. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Appellant seeks that the judgment be vacated and 
the cause be remanded and submitted to the jury on the issue of 
damages only. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 6, 1964, at approximately 9:30 A.M., on a 
clear day, plaintiff was driving east on 12th Street, an east-west 
thoroughfare in Ogden, Weber County, Utah. She was approach· 
ing the intersection of 12th Street with Wall Avenue, a north· 
south four-lane highway. The intersection is controlled by an 
overhead semaphore signal which changes in sequence from green 
to amber to red. As plaintiff approached Wall Avenue, the light 
changed to green in her favor. At the same time, defendant, oper· 
ating a private ambulance of which he was the owner, was pro-
ceeding south on Wall Avenue approaching the intersection at 
approximately 70 miles per hour (T. 130) against a red light, 
with siren and red dome light operating. Mr. Scivally, a witness 
called for defendant, testified that defendant did not diminish his 
speed when he first obsezyed him, two-tenths of a mile away, until 
defendant was approximately 5 to 10 feet from the north cross-walk 
of the intersection (T. 108). A passenger in defendant's ambu· 
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lance said that the defendant was going 70 miles an hour approach-
ing the red light (T. 130), and defendant himself estimates his 
speed as approximately 70 miles an hour at a point opposite Wil-
liamsen's Auto Body Shop on Wall Avenue, which is the same 
point he was first observed by Scivally (T. 7). The driver of the 
ambulance was proceeding from Harrisville, a Township several 
miles north of Ogden, to Ogden City to pick up a patient (T. 10). 
At the time plaintiff was proceeding into the intersection from the 
west and defendant was proceeding into the intersection from the 
north, a pick-up truck driven by one Martin, was proceeding into 
the intersection on the green light. Apparently, Martin did not 
see or hear the approaching ambulance as he was looking directly 
ahead (T. 101, 123). The plaintiff, Mrs. Howe, was observing 
Mr. Martin approaching from the east to determine whether or 
not Mr. Martin would attempt to make a left turn (T. 40) which 
he started to do and did not observe or hear the approaching ambu-
lance although, she said that she had observed a white car ap-
proaching some distance from the north (T. 39). Defendant esti-
mated his speed on entering the intersection at 40 miles per hour 
(T. 8). He had previously informed the investigating officer that 
he was going 50 miles per hour when he entered the intersection 
(T. 26). The witness, Scivally, estimated the ambulance speed 
as SO to SS miles per hour at S to IO feet from the intersection 
(T. 108) and a passenger in the ambulance estimated the speed 
upon entering the intersection at 40 to 4S miles per hour (T. 133). 
Prior to entering the intersection, the ambulance had decelerated 
because the driver had observed the green pick-up truck driven 
by Martin proceeding into the intersection and heading west. The 
light had changed to red against the defendant approximately two-
tenths of a mile to the north (T. 108, 109) and defendant entered 
the intersection against the red light and was struck by or struck 
the west-bound vehicle of Martin and careened to the west, out 
of control, and struck the vehicle in which plaintiff was seated 
3 
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(T. 16, 17). The speed limit at the time and place of the accl. 
dent for southbound vehicles was 40 miles per hour (plaintifF1 
Exhibit C). The motor vehicle which defendant was operating a1 
the time and place of the accident was owned by defendant (Pre. 
trial order, counterclaim). The defendant was not authorized by 
the Public Safety Commission of Utah, nor Ogden City to operate 
an "authorized emergency vehicle" (T. 137, T. 36). Defendant had 
obtained a certificate of registration from the Public Service Com-
mission to operate as a motor carrier under the exempt provisions 
of Section 54-6-12 Utah Code Annotated 1953, as Amended, and 
was licensed to operate an ambulance in Roy City and Harrisville 
Township in Weber County (T. 139). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT l. nrn COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GM 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. I, FOR TIIE 
REASON THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT OPERATING 
AN "AUTHORIZED EMERGENCY VEHICLE", AND THERE· 
FORE WAS NOT ENTITLED TO VIOLATE TRAFFIC REG· 
ULATIONS AND WAS THEREFORE NEGLIGENT AS A 
MATTER OF LAW. 
The requested instruction is as follows: "Instruction No. I. 
You are instructed that the defendant is negligent as a matter of 
law and that the only matter left for you to decide is the amount 
of damages to be awarded to the plaintiff." 
It was admitted by the defendant, that as he was proceeding 
south on Wall Avenue, the light was red for north and south bound 
traffic and that he entered the intersection when the light was 
red against him, (T. 108, 109) and the evidence shows that his 
speed was from 40 to 55 miles an hour (T. 8, 26, 108, 133). 
Defendants claims to be an "authorized emergency vehicle" 
and therefore entitled to the exemptions contained in Section 41-
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6-14 Utah Code Annotated, As Amended, which reads as follows 
insofar as it applies to the facts of this case: 
"Applicability and exemptions.-(a) The provisions of this 
act applicable to the drivers of vehicles upon the highways 
shall apply to the drivers of all vehicles owned or operated 
by the United States, this state or any county, city, town, 
district, or any other political subdivision of the state, includ-
ing authorized emergency vehicles; provided, however, that 
such authorized emergency vehicles shall be exempt from 
the driving restrictions imposed under sections 41-6-20 to 
and including 41-6-28, 41-6-46 to and including 41-6-82 
and 41-6-106 of this act when driven under the following 
conditions: 
(1) Said exemption shall apply whenever any said ve-
hicle is being driven in response to an emergency call or 
when used in the pursuit of an actual or suspected violator 
of the law, or when responding to but not returning from a 
fire alarm. 
(2) Said exemption herein granted to an authorized 
emergency vehicle shall apply only when the driver of any 
said vehicle while in motion sounds audible signal by bell, 
siren or exhaust whistle as may be reasonably necessary, and 
when the vehicle is equipped with at least one lighted lamp 
displaying a red light visible under normal atmospheric con-
ditions from a distance of 500 feet to the front of such vehicle. 
(b) The foregoing provisions shall not relieve the 
driver of an authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to 
drive with due regard for the safety of all persons, nor shall 
such provisions protect the driver from the consequences of 
an arbitrary exercise of the privilege declared in this section." 
It must be realized at this point that the statute in granting 
these exemptions does not concern itself with "ambulances" only 
or "emergency vehicles" only, but with "authorized emergency 
vehicles". (Italics ours.) An "authorized emergency vehicle" is 
defined for us in Section 41-6-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended as follows: (a) "Authorized Emergency Vehicle. Ve-
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hides of the fire department, police vehicles, and such ambulance 
and emergency vehicles of municipal departments or public servm 
corpora,tions as are designated or authorized by the department o1 
local authority". (Italics ours.) 
"Department" as referred to above is defined in Section 41· 
6-6, Sub-section (b), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as follows 
"Department of Public Safety of this state". 
In order for a vehicle to be "an authorized emergency vehicle' 
it would have to be either (I) fire department vehicle (2) polic! 
vehicle or (3) such ambulances and emergency vehicles of (a) 
municipal department, or (b) public service corporations, as are 
designated or authorized by the department or local authorities. 
Thus the above statute is broken down into two main cate-
gories-the vehicles claiming to be authorized must be either fin 
department or police vehicles and in addition, to this category, ii 
the vehicle falls within the category of "ambulance" or "emergenci 
vehicle", it must be of or belong to such municipal department.I 
or public service corporations as are designated by the departmenl 
or local authorities (italics ours). 
Inasmuch as it is admitted and the evidence clearly shows 
that the vehicle of defendant, Jackson, ran the red light (T. 8, 9) 
at an excessive speed (T. 8, 26, 108, 133) and without due care 
for others (T. 15, 26) in that defendant Jackson saw the vehicle 
of Martin moving into the intersection. It is incumbent upon the 
defendant to show that the defendant came within the exemptions 
of 41-6-14 Utah Code Annotated 1953 as Amended. 
There is no claim that defendant's vehicle was of a fire de· 
partment or was a police vehicle. There is no claim that defend· 
ant's vehicle was of or belonged to a municipal department or a 
public service corporation and in addition, as such was designated 
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or authorized by the Department of Public Safety or local author-
ities. 
The only claim defendant has to a right to smash his way 
through a red light at a busy intersection at high rates of speed 
in Ogden City, is that he has a privately owned ambulance serv-
ice, licensed by Harrisville Township and Roy City, and in addi-
tion is registered with the Public Service Commission, (Italics ours.) 
as follows, "is duly registered to operate as a motor carrier under 
the exempt provisions of Section 54-6-12 Utah Code Annotated 
1953, as Amended. (Defendant's Exhibit 3). 
The Public Service Commission is nowhere authorized to des-
ignate what vehicles shall be "authorized emergency vehicles", 
but only undertook in this matter to exempt the defendant from 
certain provisions such as obtaining licenses and certificates of 
convenience and necessity. 
Counsel can find but two cases that define what an "author-
ized emergency vehicle" is. They are as follows: Dallas RailWQ1j 
& Terminal Co., vs. Walsh 156 S.W. 2d 320 (Tex.) is a case which 
is almost on all fours with the case at bar. The facts of the cited 
case are that an ambulance, owned and operated by a funeral 
home, ran a stop sign and crashed into a bus while the ambulance 
claimed to be on an emergency call. The facts do not reveal what 
type of an emergency call was involved, however the ambulance 
was proceding at a high rate of speed with a siren blowing. 
The Court stated the issue was whether the driver of the 
ambulance at the time of the collision was under any duty imposed 
by statute or ordinance to stop at a stop-sign before proceeding 
into the intersection. 
The plaintiff contended that the ambulance of the funeral 
home was an "authorized emergency vehicle" under the statutes 
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of Texas and the ordinances of Dallas. Ordinance No. 2808 which 
defines "authorized emergency vehicles" as follows: 
"Vehicles of the fire department, police vehicles and such 
ambulances and emergency vehicles of municipal depart· 
ments or public service corporations as are designated or 
authorized by the Chief of Police of the City of Dallas.". 
The Court here will note that this ordinance is identical with 
the statute of the State of Utah defining "authorized emergency 
vehicles" with the exception that in the quoted ordinance the au· 
thorization is by the Chief of Police of the City of Dallas rather 
than the Public Safety Department or local authorities. In the 
same ordinance authorized emergency vehicles were authorized to 
proceed past a stop sign or stop signal, but only after slowing down 
as may be necessary for safe operation, which is identical with 
the cited Utah Statute 41-6-14 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
Amended. 
The Court in the Texas case, held that the ambulance was 
not an "authorized emergency vehicle" which would entitle it to 
proceed past the stop sign and in so doing stated: 
"In our opinion, the ambulance of Weaver Funeral Home 
was not shown by any evidence to be an ambulance of a 
municipal department or a public service corporation and 
therefore was not shown to be an 'authorized emergency 
vehicle'." 
The other case is Levy Court of Newcastle County vs. Yellow 
Cab Taxi 75 At. 2d., 421 (Del.), and th·e facts of this case are as 
follows: An ambulance owned by the county which was on an 
emergency call, ran a red light and collided in an intersection with 
a taxi cab that was proceeding against a green light. Upon suit 
being brought by the County, the defendant contended that the 
8 
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ambulance was not an "authorized emergency vehicle" as defined 
by the city ordinance, Section 10 l, which reads as follows: 
"Authorized Emergency Vehicles. Vehicles of the fire and 
police bureaus and such ambulances and emergency vehicles 
of municipal departments or public service corporations as 
are designated or authorized by the department of public 
safety." 
Once again the Court's attention is called to the fact that the 
ordinance cited is almost identical to our statute defining "author-
ized emergency vehicles". 
Further provisions of the ordinances provided that "author-
ized emergency vehicles" were exempt from regulations in regard 
to traffic regulations and speed. 
The Court's holding was as follows: 
"It is my conclusion that New Castle County is not a mu-
nicipality in the sense that its ambulancec could be desig-
nated by the Department of Public Safety as emergency ve-
hicles under Section 101 of the City Ordinances. Therefore, 
the traffic exemptions set forth under Section 606 and Sec-
tion 704 have no application in the present case. * * * Now, 
the question, Was the plaintiff's driver guilty of a negligent 
course of operation at the time of the collision which is 
constituted the sole or one of the proximate causes thereof? 
A careful consideration of all the evidence leads to but one 
conclusion; that is, he was. He was negligent per se in vio-
lating Section 203 (a) (3) of the municipal ordinances which 
constituted a contributing factor to the collision resulting 
in one of the proximate causes thereof." 
Section 203 (a) (3) referred to in the Court's opinion reads 
as follows: "'Red or Stop'-traffic facing the signal shall stop 
before entering the nearest cross-walk at the intersection or at 
such other point as may be plainly and efficiently designated by 
9 
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authority of the street and sewer department and remain stand-
ing until green or 'go' is shown alone." 
It is interesting to note that even though the defendant ad-
mitted approaching the red light at a high rate of speed (T. 8, 26) 
and that he saw the vehicle of Mr. Martin proceeding into the in-
tersection (T. 15, 26) and apparently said driver was unaware of 
the approaching ambulance (T. 101, 102, 123); that nevertheless 
the defendant proceeded at a high rate of speed, knowing that he 
must compete with favored drivers for the intersection. Defend· 
ant, therefore, did not "slow down and proceed with due caution 
for the safety of others" and apparently had no "due regard for 
the safety of others" and apparently was quite arbitrary in the 
exercises of the privileges that he felt that he had under the cited 
statute 41-6-14 Utah Code Annotated 1953. See Jensen vs. Taylor 
271 P. 2d 838, 2 Utah 196. 
As to the rights of "private" ambulances see Blashfield's Cyclo-
pedia of Automobile Law and Practice, Vol. 1, Sec. 800, page 597 
as follows: 
"The mere fact that private ambulances may have a statutory 
right of way over other vehicles on the highway in the ab-
sence of an exception in their favor does not give them the 
right to violate the speed laws or requirements that stops be 
made before entering certain streets." (Italics ours.) Citing 
West vs. Jallof 232 P. 642,113 (Ore.) 84, 36, A.L.R. 1391; 
Buck vs. Ice Delive'ry Co., 29 P. 2d 533, 146 (Ore.) 132. 
There is no evidence of negligence on the part of the plaintiff 
inasmuch as she was proceeding on the green light, she did not 
hear a siren or see a red light on the ambulance and her attention 
was devoted to the oncoming pickup truck driven by Mr. Martin 
and, as she stated, she was concerned as to whether or not Mr. 
Martin would make a left-hand turn in front of her. 
10 
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See Rogers vs. City of Los Angeles 44 P. 2d 465 which was a 
case almost on fours with the case at bar in that it involved an 
ambulance running a red light. In that case the Court stated as 
follows: 
"There is nothing to suggest negligence on her part unless 
she heard the sil'en (or saw the light) and disregarded them. 
Her duty to give way to the ambulance was based upon her 
knowledge of its approach." 
Also see Johnson vs. Maynard 342 P. 2d 884, 9 Utah 268 
which was a case where a police vehicle ran the red light and 
collided with the plaintiff who was proceeding on the green light. 
This Court held that the plaintiff was not contributorily negli-
gent and stated as follows: 
"A traveler approaching a signal controlled intersection with 
the light in her favor has the right of way and can rely on 
it until something appears to indicate it is not safe to do so. 
It is, of course, true that she cannot assume full protection 
by the traffic light and remain oblivious to cars approaching 
against it, but it is to be kept in mind that the management 
of an automobile in down-town traffic demands an aware-
ness of a number of things so that she cannot be giving her 
full attention to any particular hazard. She must be paying 
some attention to the actual operation of her car and also 
be aware of possible hazards from a number of directions; 
to the road ahead and any possible obstacles therein or pedes-
trians who may be in or approaching the cross-walk; to 
traffic which may be approaching from the east and, or, 
turning right or left in the intersection. It is because of these 
numerous hazards and to facilitate an orderly flow of traffic 
that traffic lights are installed. They permit the motorist to 
enter the intersection with some assurance of safety when 
the traffic light is in his favor." Citing Coombs vs. Perry, 2 
Ut. 2d 381, 275 P. 2d 680. 
The defendant was negligent per se in that he was not oper-
ating an "authorized emergency vehicle". He was merely oper-
11 
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ating a private ambulance and collided with plaintiff's vehicle 
while operating said private ambulance at an excessive rate of 
speed and ran a red light after noticing movement in the inter-
section and the operation of defendant's private vehicle was with-
out due regard for the safety of others. Therefore, the instruction 
requested was proper and it was error for the Court not to so 
instruct the jury. 
POINT 2. THE COURT ERRED IN NOT INSTRUCT-
ING THE JURY AS REQUESTED IN PLAINTIFF'S RE-
QUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 2. 
The requested instruction which was refused by the Court 
was as follows: 
"Instruction No. 2. You are instructed that the motor ve-
hicle that the defendant, Walter Jackson, was driving Sep· 
tember 6, 1964, and which was involved in a collision with 
a motor vehicle driven by the plaintiff, Beverly Howe, was 
not an authorized emergency vehicle as defined by the laws 
of the State of Utah, and that the defendant, Walter Jack-
son, the driver of said vehicle was subject to the duties, gen-
erally imposed upon drivers on the highway and specifically 
that he was not authorized to proceed past a red or stop 
signal or stop sign and was not authorized to exceed the 
prima fade speed limit." 
Plaintiff contends that the Instruction requested was a cor-
rect statement of law that should be applied to the facts of the 
case. In order not to be redundant, plaintiff adopts the argument 
contained in Point I, and specifically the portion of the argument 
relating to "authorized emergency vehicles" and their definition. 
It is called to the Court's attention that before any evidence 
whatsoever was introduced by either party, the Court ruled that 
the "defendant was on an emergency call and as such, under the 
12 
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authority vested it, as a licensed ambulance service that it was 
entitled to make such call." (T. 5), and thereafter prevented the 
plaintiff from introducing any evidence to show that the defend-
ant's vehicle was not an "authorized emergency vehicle" (T. 9). 
As heretofore stated at length in plaintiffs argument on Point 
I, the requested Instruction was the law as it should have applied 
to the facts of the case, therefore, it was error for the Court not 
to have so instructed the jury. 
POINT 3. THE COURT ERRED IN NOT INSTRUCTING 
THE JURY AS REQUESTED IN PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 4. 
The requested instruction is as follows: 
"Instruction No. 4. If you find from a preponderance of the 
evidence that the defendant, Walter Jackson, doing business 
as Mercy Ambulance, conducted himself in violation of the 
statute as read to you which is proposed for the safety of the 
plaintiff, Beverly Howe, and persons in whose class she was 
at the time, such conduct constituted negligence as a matter 
of law." 
The statute referred to is contained in plaintiff's Instruction 
No. 3 and is Section 41-6-24, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
Amended, which requires a vehicle facing a red signal to stop 
before entering the nearest cross-walk at an intersection or at 
such other point as may be indicated by a clearly visible line 
and shall remain standing until green is shown alone. 
The evidence shows that the defendant was not operating 
an "authorized emergency vehicle" and therefore was not entitled 
to the exemptions of Section 41-6-14, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
as Amended, and therefore was required to stop at the red light 
rather than proceeding through it and thus causing the damage 
and injuries to the plaintiff. The requested instruction therefore 
13 
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is a correct statement of the law as it is applicable to the facts 
of the case and it was error for the Court not to so instruct the 
jury. 
POINT 4. TI-IE COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUC-
TION NO. 8. 
The Instruction objected to is incorrect in that it does not 
correctly state the law. The Instruction as stated by the Court 
is as follows: 
"No. 8. An authorized emergency vehicle includes such am-
bulances as are designated or authorized as ambulances, 
either by the State of Utah, or by local municipal authori-
ties within the State of Utah." 
The Instruction clearly indicates that it was the opinion of 
the Court that in order for defendant's ambulance to be "an au-
thorized emergency" vehicle, it was necessary only for the jury 
to find that the State of Utah, alone, had designated the vehicle 
as such or that a local, municipal authority within the State of 
Uah had made such a designation without further requirements. 
This clearly does not conform to the requirement of the statute 
in that the statute gives the power to the State of Utah, through 
its Public Safety Deparment or local authorities to designate only 
such vehicles as "authorized emergency vehicles" as are "of mu-
nicipal departments or public service corporations and as are des-
ignated or authorized by the department or local authoities." 
This instruction clearly does not conform to the requirements 
of the statute 41-6-3 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as Amended. 
Before the State of Utah, (Department of Public Safety) or 
local municipal authorities can designate or authorize any such 
ambulance to be an "authorized emergency vehicle" such vehicles 
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must be of the fire department or police vehicles or of municipal 
departments or public service corporations. 
The evidence was that the vehicle of defendant was privately 
owned (Counterclaim, pretrial order) and there is no evidence 
that it was in fact of a municipal department or public service 
corporation. 
POINT 5. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
INSTRUCT TIIE JURY AS REQUESTED IN PLAINTIFF'S 
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 8. 
The plaintiffs Requested Instruction No. 8 is as follows: 
"Instruction No. 8. You are instructed that authorized emer-
gency vehicles are vehicles of the fire department, police 
vehicles and such ambulances and emergency vehicles of 
municipal departments or public service corporations as are 
designated or authorized by the Department of Public Safety 
or local authorities." 
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction No. 8 was and is a correct 
statement of the law and is based upon the following statutes of 
the State of Utah: 41-6-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
Amended: 
"(a) Authorized Emergency Vehicle. Vehicles of the fire 
department, police vehicles, and such ambulances and emer-
gency vehicles of municipal departments or public service 
corporations as are designated or authorized by the depart-
ment or local authority." 
41-6-6 (b) Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as Amended: 
"'Department'. The Department of Public Safety of this 
state." 
The instruction was, therefore, a correct statement of the 
law as it is applicable to the facts of this case, the jury should 
have been so instructed. 
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CONCLUSION 
The evidence clearly shows that defendant's vehicle was not 
an "authorized emergency vehicle" and therefore the exemptions 
contained in 41-6-14, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as Amended, 
did not apply to defendant's operation of his vehicle. The de-
fendant was negligent per se in running the red light at the time 
and place of the accident; that defendant was further negligent 
in that he was not operating his vehicle with due regard for the 
safety of others. Plaintiff was not contributorily negligent in that 
she had the right of way and had no notice of the fact that defend-
ant would not observe the rules of the road and keep his vehicle 
under proper control. For these reasons the verdict of the jury 
should be vacated and the cause remanded for trial on the issue 
of damages only. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GEORGE B. HANDY 
Attorney for 
P laintif {-Appellant 
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